Introduction
When President George W. Bush received 'fast-track' trade promotion authority (TPA) in 2002 which, in essence, gives him much greater power to pursue trade negotiations, many economists looked with interest to see where this power would be applied. One optimistic perspective on recent US trade policy is that TPA was purchased at the considerable cost of US steel tariffs and the bloated Farm Billnecessary quos for the quid of domestic political support for TPA -so it must be highly valued by the Bush administration and therefore would be used extensively and wisely to promote trade agreements. The particular hope of many economists was that it would signal a renewed US commitment to multilateralism and decreased emphasis on preferential trading deals. This was especially the hope in New Zealand (NZ), an exporter of products in the world's most protected sector, agriculture, and a miniscule one at that, with little power in bilateral settings.
While it is perhaps too early to assess the US commitment to multilateralisma less optimistic view of the steel tariffs and Farm Bill is that they represent a total capitulation of US international economic interests to domestic political interests -it does seem that the TPA has triggered a rash of negotiations for bilateral preferential trading arrangements. So the US is in the final stages of preparing a deal with Singapore, another with Chile is the first of a planned series of dominoes in South America. The US Trade Representative (USTR) has also notified Congress of its intentions to open negotiations with the countries of the South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland), with those of the * We are grateful to Sisira Jayasiriya for all his efforts in organising Peter Lloyd's festschrift and for his editorial assistance in preparing this paper. We are also grateful to Peter Lloyd and festschrift participants for useful discussion of this paper and, particularly, to Don McLaren and an anonymous referee for very helpful suggestions and comments. All remaining errors, of course, are our coauthor's.
Central American Integration System (Costa Rico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala) and with Morocco.
From a NZ perspective perhaps the most significant deal the US has indicated it will start to negotiate is that with Australia. The significance of this lies not just in its immediate impact on NZ, as an exporter competing with Australia in many markets and product lines, but also in its impacts on the dynamic political economy of NZ's own trade relations. Given the close economic relations between Australia and NZ, as represented by the eponymous free trade area Closer Economic Relations, would a US-Australia deal make the addition of NZ a fairly straightforward step?
Would it be easier, in fact, than creating a US-NZ deal directly in that the major barrier to such a deal is very likely the US farm lobby and that would have to have been overcome for a US-Australia deal to go ahead? Or would it make a US-NZ deal more difficult -would the US farm lobby draw the line at favourable treatment for even more efficient farmers or would Australian interests oppose the inclusion of competing NZ farmers in a deal giving preferential access to US markets?
Great interest was stimulated in NZ in November 2002 when the US Trade
Representative, Robert Zoellick, notified Congress of his office's intention to initiate negotiations with Australia, as required by the US Trade Act. The interest came from the following two sentences at the close of the 7-page letter: "Given the integration of the economies of Australia and New Zealand, New Zealand has been advocating its case to the Administration, as well as to Congress, that an FTA with New Zealand would complement our FTAs with Singapore and Australia. We will be soliciting the views of the Congress on this matter as we move forward with the Australia FTA." (USTR 2002, p.7.) While one can hardly conclude from this that a US-NZ FTA is imminent, nevertheless the possibility has at least been raised and it reinforces the potential significance of the questions raised above.
While we do not purport to answer these questions in this paper, they do provide some of the rationale for the exercises we do conduct here. We evaluate USAustralia, US-New Zealand and US-Australia-New Zealand free trade agreements using computable general equilibrium modelling. The comparative statics exercise we consider involves removing import tariffs, export subsidies (both positive and negative) and transport costs on trade in all commodities between nations in the free trade area. Hence our calculations are likely to represent the upper limit of changes due to the proposed trade agreements.
Model structure and data source
We use Version 5 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Data Base (Betina and McDougall, 2002) , which is a representation of the world economy in 1997. The data base, "combines detailed bilateral trade, transport and protection data characterising economic linkages among regions, together with individual country input-output data bases which account for inter-sectoral linkages within regions" (Hertel 2002, p.1-2) . Five primary factors, 57 sectors and 66 regions are identified.
We operationalise the data base using the GTAP5inGAMS model. GTAP5inGAMS is a static, multi-regional CGE model that determines the production and allocation of goods. Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) outline the model in detail. We confine our discussion of GTAP5inGAMS to its salient features, which are listed in Table 1 . Table 1 Model structure Imports Using the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969) , imports are differentiated by source and composite imports are differentiated from domestic production. The regional composition of imports is the same in public, private and intermediate demand, but the aggregate share of imports may differ across demands. Following Scollay and Gilbert (2000) we double all Armington elasticities generated from the GTAP Data Base, so as to focus on long-run changes.
Production
Goods and services are produced by perfectly competitive firms under constant returns to scale technologies. Leontief nests of value added and a composite of intermediate inputs produce outputs. At a lower level of the production nest, a CobbDouglas aggregation of primary factors produces value added in each sector, and a further Leontief nest of intermediate inputs by product type produces an intermediate composite for each sector.
Expenditure on final goods
A utility maximising representative agent determines private, public and investment demand in each region. Public and investment expenditures are fixed in absolute value, so only the value of private expenditure changes with income. Private and public expenditures are Cobb-Douglas functions of domestic-import composites by product category.
Primary Factors
Factors are perfectly mobile intersectorally but immobile internationally. Land and natural resources are specific to agriculture and mining respectively.
Our aggregation of the GTAP Data Base, for most of our simulations, is displayed in To give some idea of the regions we are modelling here, Table 3 shows each region's share of global trade and the importance of trade in the region (as a percentage of regional GDP.) As is common, the smaller the country or region, the more significant is trade as a proportion of national income. (Betina and McDougall, 2002) .
Further details of the regions are provided in Appendix Tables A1-A4 which detail NZ exports, Australian exports, NZ imports and US imports respectively, all by sector and trading partner as described in products (about a fifth) and wool (almost all). In all of these tables it is well to remember that Australia has a population some five times that of NZ and a GDP some seven times greater. 
The simulations
We now turn to our simulations. The basic exercise we consider is to abolish all trade interventions amongst FTA members, while maintaining barriers against nonmembers at their initial levels. However, as FTAs invariably involve more than simple trade barrier reductions, frequently introducing standards harmonisation and the like, we attempt to capture these gains by abolishing transport costs between participating countries as well. harmful, a three-way FTA is beneficial but an exclusive FTA between the US and NZ is the best possible outcome. None of the effects are particularly massive, however, with the annual benefit of a US-NZ deal adding only three quarters of a percentage point to GDP, or less than US$0.5b. The same qualitative results hold for Australiait would prefer an exclusive FTA with the US to a three-way arrangement but that is preferred to a US-NZ FTA and none of them are a particularly big deal. The US gains from any FTA with the three-way being most attractive, a deal with NZ alone next most appealing and an exclusive deal with Australia being only barely profitable. Scollay (2002) allows for this by recalibrating the baseline with zero auto tariffs. This adjustment makes no significant difference to our results, however, and is not done here. Other differences between our approach and Scollay's include our adjustment of the GTAP elasticities to better approximate long run effects and the fact that we abolish all trade restrictions, including export subsidies and transport costs, in contrast to Scollay's exercise of removing only tariffs.
Finally, the rest of the world loses most from a three-way deal and least from a USAustralia deal. What to make of these results? First, the losses to the non-member country in the twocountry FTAs are for standard trade diversion reasons, as the US switches its import source towards its partner country. Indeed, this mitigates some of the negative effects on the non-member country as shown in Appendix Table A5 where the consequences for NZ exports of a US-Australia and three-way FTA are shown. In a US-Australia FTA, NZ exports to the rest of the world increase in most significant sectors but in a three-way FTA those exports to non-members decrease. Also, in a US-Australia FTA, NZ agricultural exports to Australia increase significantly, presumably replacing Australian products now sold into the US: NZ exports to the US of dairy and wool decline significantly in such a FTA.
In a three-way FTA NZ exports to the US of dairy products and 'other food products' increase very dramatically (as do Australian exports in those categories, as shown in Appendix Table A6 ) although wool exports decline, more than replaced by Australian export increases. In the domestic market, a US-Australia FTA has very little impact on NZ imports (see Appendix Table A7) , with a slight decline in some agricultural imports from Australia. In the three-way FTA, however, there are substantial increases in imports from the US in many sectors (and overall) and a slight decrease in imports from Australia (driven largely by decreased imports of transport equipment and other equipment, all more than replaced by imports from the US.) Not surprisingly, overall NZ imports of all agricultural products increase in the three-way FTA, presumably as NZ domestic sales are diverted to the more lucrative US market and replaced by imports from other sources. Finally, Appendix Table A8 shows that, from a NZ perspective, a US-Australia FTA leads to a very small decline in every product price (relative to the model's numeraire, the price of services in the US) and small, mostly negative, output effects whereas a three-way deal increases all prices and has large positive effects on dairy and 'other agricultural' outputs and significant negative effects on most manufacturing output levels.
We turn next to the consequences of these FTAs for real factor returns in our countries of interest. Table 6 shows the consequences for factor owners of a USAustralia FTA. The general effect in NZ is a small decline in factor returns, corresponding to the small negative effect on NZ welfare of such a deal. The greatest beneficiaries in Australia of such a deal are landowners -land is specific to agriculture in this model, recall, and the biggest impact of such a deal is on Australian agricultural exports. One curious result here is that the returns to Australian natural resources -specific to mining in the model -decline following a US-Australia FTA, despite the increased volume of Australian exports to the US in minerals and energy.
However, as shown in Table A6 , overall Australian exports in these sectors decline in the two-way FTA. The US tariff against Australia on this sector is very low and the formation of a FTA consequently has little trade creation effect. But the expansion of other sectors comes at the overall expense of this sector; hence the declining return to its specific factor. Turning to the three-way FTA, Table 7 shows the consequences for factor returns here. Little is affected in the initial FTA members (except that the negative consequences for US landowners increase to half a percentage point or so) but there is a very significant increase in the return to NZ landowners (and a less significant increase in return to unskilled labour. 2 ) 
Sensitivity analysis
We double elasticity parameters governing substitution possibilities between imports by source and between composite imports and domestic production to examine the sensitivity of our results to the assigned values of these parameters. Table 8 reports welfare changes for such an experiment. Our results are qualitatively similar under the two import specifications, although gains to the US and New Zealand from trade liberalisation involving the two countries are significantly larger when substitution possibilities in the import specification are increased, particularly so for New Zealand.
For instance, comparing Tables 5 and 8 shows that the gain to NZ from a three-way FTA in the latter case is over double that in the former. Additionally, welfare reductions in the rest of the world from all of the FTAs are roughly twice as large when Armington elasticity parameters are increased. The change in Australian welfare is not significantly affected by changes in import specification. 
Alternative trade liberalisation shocks
We conclude our analysis by considering a number of alternative scenarios for trade liberalisation that might occur under the aegis of a free trade area. First we turn to scenarios involving less liberalisation than that considered so far. Suppose we simply abolished tariffs alone, leaving export interventions and transport costs unaffected. Table 9 shows the effects of this shock. Interestingly, the negative consequences of being left out of a FTA are greater in this case than in the more extensive liberalisation summarised in Table 5 . Of course, the gains from membership are reduced in this exercise; so much so, in fact, that Australia actually loses from a threeway FTA. Presumably these are the standard losses from trade diversion. Two possible reasons for this are that Australia benefits either from importing goods subsidised through US export subsidies or from any terms of trade effects of its own export taxes. The data base reveals that US export subsidies on trade with
Australia are negligible, however, so the first of these explanations is unlikely. But
Australia does impose export taxes on some of its trade with the US -most notably in wool (9.4%) -so one explanation for this observation is that Australia derives terms of trade benefits from those export restrictions which are lost under complete liberalisation. To investigate this we consider a number of exercises in which we remove Australian export interventions one at a time. Appendix Table A9 shows one of these -all subsidies and taxes are removed except the Australian tax on wool exports (to the relevant FTA partners). Comparing the results of these exercises to those in Tables 9 and 10 reveals that these taxes are, indeed, the source of some of Australia's gains from trade. Compared to the status quo benchmark, for instance, Table 9 shows that Australia gains US$44.6m from an exclusive deal with the US when only tariffs are removed but, from Table A9 ); other exercises (not shown) demonstrate that if Australia also retained its tax in the 'other food' category its gain would be US$31.55m; if it retained the tax on lumber its gain would be US$31.77m and so on.
One other point that arises from these alternative simulations is that the effects of transport costs are quite asymmetric across countries here, impinging most severely on Australian gains from trade. Recall that our argument for including their reduction in our initial scenario was that FTAs frequently cover more than simply trade barriers and, to the extent that they ease trade between member countries in other ways, that could be best captured by a reduction in non-trade-barrier trade costs. The asymmetric significance of those costs in this context, however, suggests perhaps that reducing transport costs is not the best way to capture those effects here.
A further issue we can consider is to ask what might happen if the US agricultural lobby were to assert itself and get special treatment for agriculture in a FTA. We consider first the most extreme case in which they are completely successful and agricultural trade restrictions post-FTA are maintained at their pre-FTA levels. Table 11 shows the welfare results here and comparison with Table 5 shows, unsurprisingly, dramatically lower gains for all countries -particularly New Zealand -from any FTA. We also see that the US actually loses from a FTA with NZ in such a setting, emphasizing that the gains to the US from a full FTA with NZ are largely from consumption and production efficiencies in the agricultural sector. A more limited restriction on agricultural exemptions is modelled in Table 12 wherein only meat and dairy products -two of the most important of NZ's export sectors in its trade with the US -are exempted. A convex combination of the liberalisations in Tables 5 and 11 , the results are a convex combination of the results in those Tables too.
A further exercise we consider is shown in Table 13 and involves only the dairy sector being exempted from any FTA. The gains to the US from a US-NZ deal are still substantially lower here than in a full FTA (at around US$441m versus US$1,691m) but its gains from a FTA with Australia are actually higher than in the full FTA case. Indeed, aggregate world welfare increases by more in a US-Australia FTA that excludes dairy (a gain of around US$585m) than in a comprehensive one (around US$576m). The reason for this is presumably the trade diversion effect of a FTA that includes dairy but excludes the world's lowest-cost producer, NZ, an interpretation that is reinforced by observing the substantial increase in gains to the importing country (the US) when a three-way FTA is comprehensive (giving a US gain from the FTA of US$2,280m) versus one that excludes dairy products (giving a US gain from the FTA of only US$1,112m.) We also determine the consequences of these assorted FTAs on the assumption that the US' other negotiations were to proceed successfully and result in FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Morocco and the South African CU. The results are reported in Appendix Table A10 and are broadly as one would expect: exclusion from a deal with the US is now more costly (NZ would lose US$37.2m from being left out, versus US$24.0m in Table 10 ) and inclusion more valuable, particularly for NZ who would gain US$415.4m from inclusion in such a deal, versus US$280.0m in Table 10 .
Nevertheless, the numbers here are still not particularly large and we have run another simulation exercise to consider an alternative benchmark: global free trade. Table 14 shows the results of this and demonstrates the far more substantial gains to be had, to all participating countries, from such a global deal. One final exercise we consider follows from the discussion, at least in Australia, of the consequences of a FTA with the US for relationships with Asia.
Accordingly, we have looked at the consequences of a US-Australia FTA with East
Asian countries separated out so that we can observe the effects on Australian trade with these countries. Appendix Table A11 shows the welfare effects of our assorted FTAs on NZ, Australia, the US, East Asia and the rest of the world (with only tariffs and export subsidies removed so the results are directly comparable with those in Table 10 .) Appendix Table A12 shows the effects of a US-Australia FTA on Australian exports to these groups of countries. Interestingly, both tables show that the effects on East Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) are broadly similar to those on the rest of the world in our other simulations. While East Asia is more sensitive than the rest of the world to all of the ANZUS FTAs we consider, the most notable impacts are those of a US-NZ FTA and a three-way deal which both have a substantially larger negative welfare effect on East Asia than on the rest of the world as a whole. As far as Australian trade is concerned, Table A12 does not suggest that East Asian trade would be affected particularly unusually compared to that of other non-members of a US-Australia FTA (across all sectors we find a 2.09% fall in Australian exports to East Asia versus a 2.35% fall in exports to the rest of the world, and remarkably little difference sector by sector.) All in all, we do not find much evidence to support the notion that a US-Australia FTA, in particular, would have substantial negative consequences in East Asia. The political signal sent by signing such an agreement is another matter entirely, however.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper we have considered a number of FTA permutations involving Australia, NZ and the US using the GTAP Data Base and static computable general equilibrium model GTAP5inGAMS. One of the most obvious features of the results is that the welfare consequences are not particularly large, even for a small country such as NZ in an extensive three-way FTA -an extra three-quarters of a percentage point on national income is not trivial, but it is still only a little over NZ$200 per capita. It might be argued that the downside of this is that these FTAs have little to offer; the upside that exclusion from them is not costly -even if the alternative for NZ is to be left out of a bilateral US-Australia deal that only adds less than an extra two hundredths of a percentage point of national income to the cost.
A recent CIE paper (CIE 2001) also analyses the impact of an Australian-US free trade area using two models: the Asia Pacific G-Cubed model and the GEMPACK version of the GTAP model. Its simulated increases in real GDP for included countries are greater than ours using both models and, using the Asia Pacific G-Cubed model, it finds that New Zealand gains (marginally) from a US-Australia free trade area, an effect we do not reproduce. Using the Asia Pacific G-Cubed model, the authors observe increases in real GDP of 0.33 percent, 0.02 percent, and 0.03 percent in Australia, the US, and New Zealand respectively. They attribute the gain to New Zealand to a larger Australian economy and the diversion of Australian dairy products from East Asia to the US, although our results suggest that East Asia is not atypical vis-à-vis the rest of the world in this respect. There are many differences between the Asia-Pacific G-Cubed and GTAP5inGAMS models. Most significantly, the former is dynamic and the latter is static. There are, however, also dissimilarities between these authors' GTAP simulations and ours: (a) they use Version 4 of the GTAP Data Base, updated to 1998-99 using their own adjustments, while we use Version 5 of the data base; (b) they employ the GEMPACK version of the GTAP model, while we employ the GAMS version, and (c) aggregations differ in the two models. While our results and theirs do differ, nevertheless both studies indicate that the formation of an US-Australia free trade area will only marginally influence national welfare in the three countries of concern.
What does this paper imply for our earlier questions concerning the dynamics of trade negotiations? Our numbers do suggest that the addition of NZ to a US-Australia deal should meet with relatively strong support from the US and little opposition from Australia but, of course, they must be read subject to the vital caveat that the political economy of trade policy often has little to do with national welfare as economists usually measure it. Reading the USTR's letter to the Senate notifying of the intention to negotiate with Australia (USTR 2002) it is difficult to find much discussion of the gains to US consumers from lower import prices in their trade with Australia. 3 And nor do the press in Australia and NZ typically trumpet the potential of a deal with the US as lying in the wealth of cheap imports that will follow. While trade policy has always been a strict subset of foreign policy, it does appear that this is more explicitly the case with the US under the current Bush administration than it has been in the past (not explicitly in terms of stated policy, where the separation of 'pure'
foreign policy and trade policy is still insisted upon, but de facto, it seems, in the practice of trade policy where the choice of trading partners is clearly not independent of foreign policy goals. 4 )
Our own conclusion drawn from this exercise is that our priors are confirmed:
the best hope for NZ and Australia is multilateralism and negotiation capital is probably best devoted to the pursuit of trade efforts through the WTO.
Finally, it should be stressed that our results are subject to all of the usual caveats surrounding CGE modelling and to the particular caveats that follow from our use of the GTAP Data Base. As noted earlier, the absence of comprehensive data on services protection is a significant shortcoming of the data base, especially in the context of analysing FTAs in which services feature prominently. Furthermore, we have noted that our baseline simulations, using transport cost reductions as a proxy for non-trade-barrier-related liberalisations associated with an FTA, perhaps do not capture this perfectly and it would be an interesting topic for future study to find a more suitable means of representing such effects in a static model such as that used here. 
Appendix: Tables of further results

